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The Historic Joint Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs and Cabinet Committee on Security

Kargil 1999



Cabinet Secretary
New Delhi

D.O. No. 48051/1/98-0 &M

Dated the 11th May 1990 0030 Hours

Representatives and Special Invitees,

The Joint Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs and Cabinet Committee on Security has been called by the Honorable Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee to discuss the urgent situation of Kargil. Attendance of all the members is mandatory. Please find the details of the meeting on the last page.

The document as asked by the Honorable Prime Minister has been divided into 2 parts where in the first talks about India Pakistan relations in general and second discusses the current situation that the country has seen in the past 10 days. This comes at a time when the air was active about the Lahore Declaration makes the current situation more prevalent.

The committee will be a fast paced committee and will work on the updates received till now and any other update that is received by the office of the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/-

Prabhat

(Prabhat Kumar)

To,

1. Minister of Defence

2. Minister of External Affairs
3. Minister of Finance
4. Minister of Home Affairs
5. Minister of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation
6. Minister of Shipping
7. Minister of Law & Justice and Company Affairs
8. Minister of Industry
9. Minister of Petroleum & Natural Gas
10. Minister of Environment & Forest
11. Minister of Power
12. Minister of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises
13. Minister of Coal
14. Minister of Tribal Affairs
15. Minister of Rural Development
16. Minister of Chemicals & Fertilizers & Food and Consumer Affairs
17. Minister of Labour
18. Minister of Social Justice & Empowerment
19. Minister of Civil Aviation
20. Minister of Information & Broadcasting
21. Minister of Commerce

SPECIAL INVITEES

22. Chief Minister of J&K
23. Chief of the Army Staff
24. Chief of the Naval Staff
25. Chief of the Air Staff
26. Staff officer of & on hotline to the Commander of 121(Independent) Infantry Brigade Group (stationed at Kargil)
27. Staff officer of & on hotline to the Commander of 12th Battalion, The Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry
28. Staff officer of & on hotline to the Commanding officer of 1/11 Gorkha rifles
29. National Security Advisor
30. Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat
31. Chief of Research and Analysis Wing
32. Director of the Intelligence Bureau

Part I

Indo-Pak Relations

Key Points

- Relations between Pakistan and India are complicated. Characterised by ups and downs and intermittent breakdowns, the future of the relationship is anything but certain.
- The issues of Kashmir and terrorism remain as challenging as ever. They continue to shape the relationship and are significant hurdles to normalising relations.
- Despite these difficulties, dialogue is rarely disrupted for long, and there are many opportunities both countries can capitalise on to build warmer relations in the longer term.
- Should relations become normalised, both states may enjoy great economic benefits, as well as ongoing stability in the region

Since their independence as new nations in 1947, India and Pakistan have followed a path of mutual animosity.

The story of an enduring Indo-Pakistan rivalry is a familiar one, in which the neighboring states, born of a bloody partition, are trapped in an endless cycle of conflict. Although there is a lot of hatred we also have seen cooperation over water, trade and talks has survived changes in government, of various political stripes, on both sides of the board.

However constant problems between India & Pakistan have no specific root cause and both the countries are seen blaming each other for every single problem that happens between them. The focus here lies on the fact that every incident that happens between Pakistan & our country, leads a deep impact, which comes out in the form of aggression on each occasion. Hence the current scenario in hand can also be seen as an after effect of the various things that have been between the two countries and hence it is necessary to have a brief knowledge about the various confrontations in the past.

Analysis

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Since partition, relations between Pakistan and India have been constantly challenged by territorial disputes and competing state narratives and nationalism. With the Kashmir issue taking centre stage in their tumultuous relationship, India and Pakistan fought three wars in the first 25 years of their existence.

This rivalry was heightened in 1989 by Pakistani support for an insurgency in Indian Kashmir using military proxies. As the impasse over Kashmir continued, tensions escalated further in 1998 when India, followed by Pakistan, began testing nuclear weapons. The tests caused great anxiety among the international community and led to sanctions being placed on both countries. Seeking to avoid further sanctions and to appease international pressure, India and Pakistan initiated talks that resulted in the Lahore Declaration, which was signed by the two countries' prime ministers in February 1999. The declaration committed both states to 'intensify their efforts to resolve all issues.'

Challenges to Normalisation and Peaceful Relations

Despite the wish of both countries to normalise relations, two main challenges continue to obstruct it. The first is reaching a resolution on Kashmir, a prospect that appears increasingly difficult given the political roadblocks that currently exist. The second is the issue of terrorism and Pakistan's inability to curtail militant activities and prosecute terrorists. If Pakistan-India relations are to improve, these two challenges must be overcome.

Kashmir

Although Pakistani and Indian leaders have acknowledged a mutually agreeable basis for settlement, the issue of Kashmir remains unresolved and continues to hamper relations. The contested area has divided the two states for some 60 years and, as such, is a highly sensitive issue. Any resolution therefore faces political roadblocks and widespread public discontent. This is especially the case since the Mumbai attacks, as nationalism has increased and the popular images of one another have hardened. To be sure, as 'the public sentiment in India is hostile, and Pakistani political parties have disowned the progress made in the Composite Dialogues, contending that frameworks agreed upon were authorised by a military dictator seen to lack the mandate for such unilateral decisions.

The issue of Kashmir may not be as salient as other recent concerns such as terrorism, especially given that the ongoing stalemate has lasted almost 60 years. Nevertheless, it remains a significant hurdle and has the potential, along with related violence and its ability to spark nationalistic movements, to once again derail relations, as it has in the past.

Terrorism

A topic which doesn't need much to discuss and deliberate and is known to everyone

Shared Economic Interests and Steps Forward

One avenue with the potential to change Pakistan-India relations is economic co-operation. In recent times, efforts to unite Kashmir 'through cross-Line of Control bus service, partial liberalisation of visa regimes and the creation of intra-Kashmir business entities, such as the Federation of Jammu and Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have symbolised an attempt to approach the problem of Kashmir, emblematic of larger bilateral challenges, through less conventional means.'

Beyond Kashmir, trade ties between the two states have great potential. Pakistan, in particular, has much to gain if it can penetrate the buoyant Indian market. In order for this to happen, however, it will need to reciprocate India's granting Pakistan most favoured nation (MFN) status in 1996.'

India, meanwhile, will need to reduce its current non-tariff barriers, which have proved major impediments to improving economic ties. Should these events materialise, the trade potential between the two states could be as much as \$20 billion annually, roughly a tenfold increase on current figures.

1947: Partition & Colonialism

The conflict between India and Pakistan originated as a clash between Indian and Muslim nationalism during British colonial rule. The Indian National Congress led the Indian-nationalist struggle, while the principal Muslim-nationalist political organisation was the Muslim League. As the British government retreated from South Asia after WWII, it served notice on these two organizations to negotiate a constitutional framework for postcolonial India before its departure in 1947. But the bitter tensions created by the colonial legacy of divide and rule made it impossible for the parties to meet this demand within the prescribed time. Consequently, the British government imposed its own plan and departed. According to this plan, devised by the last British Viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, areas whose populations were predominantly Muslim, were to join Pakistan, while Hindu-majority areas were to be part of India.

In the 565 princely states of South Asia, which were not governed directly by the British, the decision to join either India or Pakistan was left to their rulers. They were, of course, not required to act according to their people's wishes. Jammu and Kashmir had a largely Muslim population but was ruled by a Hindu who decided to join India.

The boundary between India and Pakistan was drawn by a British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe. The incompetence and apathy with which the British colonial regime handled its departure had catastrophic consequences. Some three million people lost their lives and seventeen million were compelled to leave their homes.

1947: First Kashmir War

India intervened in Kashmir in 1947 on the pretext that as a regional great power, it had an interest in maintaining order in this strategically sensitive region near China and the Soviet Union. Pakistan had inherited a very small army that was almost completely reliant on British officers. The British Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan's Army initially refused to send Pakistani troops to bolster the rebellions against Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir. As a result, Pakistan's political leadership felt the urgent need to acquire military readiness. The competition for control over Jammu and Kashmir led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947. The continuation of the conflict and tension between the two countries led them to begin an arms race and helped consolidate the influence of their national security institutions.

Following this war, relations between the two countries remained calm and neither side sought to escalate the conflict. During this time, UN efforts to organise a plebiscite to determine the wishes of Kashmiris were unsuccessful, but neither country decided to intensify the conflict.

1960: Indus Water Treaty

In 1960, India and Pakistan concluded The Indus Water Treaty, which enabled them to peacefully share water from the Indus and its tributaries. As the Indus-basin irrigation system was central to survival of the ecology that sustains life in the northern region of South Asia, it was important for the two governments to arrive at an agreement. The international community took an interest in the problem and made World Bank Funds and technical know how available. The two countries set up a joint body to carry out the treaty and to handle disagreements. Even when India and Pakistan have been at war, they have meticulously observed their obligations under this treaty. Although the construction of huge dams and the displacement of people have had very destructive consequences, the fact is that the two governments did devise and run a system that maintained peace. This illustrates the ability of India and Pakistan to successfully resolve a serious problem.

1965: The Rann of Kutch

A dispute arose over disagreements regarding the border in the Rann of Kutch (a 20,000 sq. km. salt marsh). After serious skirmishes in 1965, India and Pakistan set up a special tribunal. The tribunal was strongly criticised in India, but the government carried out all its obligations. When, in accordance with the tribunal's decision, a small piece of land was given to Pakistan, the leader of the Hindu-fundamentalist Jana Sangh Party, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (who is now India's Prime Minister) tried to block the transfer, but did not succeed. The successful conclusion of the dispute demonstrates that when the two governments decide that co-operation is in their interest, they can overcome obstacles to achieve their common goals.

1965: Second Kashmir War

When Pakistan failed to get the Security Council to take new diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Kashmir dispute in 1964, it tried to compel India to make concessions by fomenting an uprising in Indian-administered Kashmir. India retaliated by attacking Kashmir and its army also crossed into Pakistan in the Punjab and Sindh. Pakistan prevented India from capturing any important towns, but as it had a small army and munitions, it would have faced difficulties if the war had continued.

As both the U.S. and the Soviet Union feared that China would enter the conflict on behalf of Pakistan, the UN Security Council called for an end to hostilities and the war stopped after seventeen days on September 22, 1965.

Pakistan's government, led by President Ayub Khan accepted an OFFER for mediation made by the Soviet Union. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Khan met in Uzbekistan and concluded the Tash-kent Declaration on January 10, 1966. This declaration became very unpopular in both countries. As both sides tried to convince people that they had achieved spectacular gains in the war, the accord was widely perceived as

a bad bargain, and hard-line nationalists and religious zealots protested. In Pakistan, there was a division in the political establishment, as Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto soon left the government and criticised the declaration. The national security institutions in both India and Pakistan then became very conscious of the possible political costs of concessions to their adversaries.

1971: Freedom for Bangladesh War

The second major conflict between India and Pakistan was also the result of state initiatives. In 1968, a mass movement against President Ayub Khan's authoritarian rule had led to the re-imposition of direct military rule in Pakistan, with the military promising to hold elections for an assembly to frame a new constitution, and then convert into a parliament to govern the country. After the promised elections were held in 1970, and the Bengali-nationalist Awami League acquired an absolute majority in the assembly, the army changed its mind. Instead of handing over power to the Awami League, the army began a brutal military assault against it. The crisis quickly escalated into a major international conflict. India claimed that the presence of millions of Bengali refugees on its territory made it a party to the conflict. India attacked East Pakistan in December 1971 and the conflict spread to the Western borders as Pakistan launched limited air strikes and made a determined military push in Kashmir. The war ended on December 17, after the Pakistan army surrendered in East Pakistan. Bangladesh then emerged as an independent state.

The conclusion of this conflict was also followed by a realistic appreciation of the new situation by the political and military leadership of Pakistan. Bhutto, Pakistan's new civilian president, held negotiations with India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. They concluded the Simla Agreement on July 2, 1972 and agreed to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. They also agreed not to unilaterally alter the existing "Line of Control" dividing their armed forces in Kashmir.

1979: War in Afghanistan

Bhutto's government was replaced by a military regime when General Zia-ul-Haq seized power in 1977. He used Islamisation to legitimise his rule. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan acquired the status of a frontline state in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Pakistan's army was used by the U.S. to organise resistance to the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Pakistan's patronage to hard-line Islamists within the country, the massive recruitment for military and ideological training, and the spread of weapons provided by NATO countries, created a fertile ground in both Pakistan and Afghanistan for Islamic insurgency in the region.

1984: Kashmir Again

In April 1984, the Indian Army captured some mountain outposts in northern Kashmir. This placed the Indian army near Pakistan's access routes to China. Casualties claimed by the harsh climate were greater than those caused by actual fighting.

1989: Campaign in Kashmir

Due to developments in Kashmir's civil society, a qualitative change occurred in India-Pakistan relations in 1989. A massive public campaign for Azadi (independence) emerged in the Valley of Kashmir. This movement dramatically increased the tension between India and Pakistan and brought them to the brink of full-scale war. The Azadi campaign began peacefully and was led mostly by secular nationalists. It quickly turned violent when India's armed forces fired on peaceful public demonstrations. The Indian government then cracked down on all institutions of civil society. They used "cordon and search" operations: curfews were imposed and then house-to-house searches were carried out. There were numerous complaints of rape and torture. The Indian army eventually crushed the resistance led by secular groups.

Pakistan was initially surprised by the Azadi campaign. Once it began, Pakistan's military leadership tried to guide it in a direction that would be in its own interest. Besides the military, politically-powerful Islamist groups, were also ready to offer support to Kashmiri youth that were compelled to flee the Indian army. Weapons were easily available from the pipeline set up for the Afghan jihad. As a result, Indian armed forces continue to face effective resistance in Kashmir.

1998: Nuclear Tests

When the BJP formed the federal government in 1998, it moved swiftly to satisfy the demand of India's national security establishment to test nuclear weapons. Pakistan responded with its own nuclear tests. When the Indian and Pakistani leaders began negotiations in 1999, Pakistan's Prime Minister thanked his Indian counterpart for conducting the nuclear tests, for it had provided Pakistan the pretext to come out of the nuclear closet

Conclusion

The future of Pakistan-India relations is far from certain. There are both major problems and opportunities that could tilt the relationship either way. The protracted issues of Kashmir and terrorism will remain a thorn in the side of both states and will continue to hamper the normalisation of relations into the future. That said, there are also opportunities which both states can capitalise on in order to improve their economic and security ties and possibly normalise the relationship moving forward. Economic ties continue to gain momentum with piecemeal initiatives and reforms, and there is much hope on both sides that trade will continue to grow. Afghanistan appears less certain, but both states would do well to fashion a security agreement that promotes peace and security in the region while taking into account the various national interests of all the states involved. If that can be achieved, then the problem of militant insurgency, especially in Pakistan's north, which continues to concern India, would become less significant. That, too, would certainly contribute to better relations between Pakistan and India in the future.

Part II
Current Scenario

Background to the Lahore Summit

According to the Pakistani side the Lahore process actually started somewhere in August 1996 Frank Wisner, the then U.S. Ambassador to India, had gone to Pakistan and called on Nawaz Sharif as the Leader of the Opposition. Nawaz Sharif asked Wisner "Mr. Ambassador, will India ever negotiate seriously on Kashmir?" Wisner said "Only if both sides show flexibility." All of you are so stuck on your maximalist positions that no negotiations can actually succeed; if that is the national consensus on both sides." Three months later, when the (Benazir Bhutto) government was dismissed and the election campaign started, Nawaz Sharif twice made a statement during the campaign that "my priorities will be to hold intensive, serious negotiations with India on Kashmir and try to improve relations with India". He made those statements deliberately. In the February 1997 elections his party won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, 140 out of 200, which was unprecedented.

He received a congratulatory letter from Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda. In the reply to that message Sharif wrote "I share your desire for improved relations but that requires serious negotiations and I suggest that we begin negotiations at the Foreign Secretaries' level if possible before the end of March 1997." India then replied "We are ready." The first meeting at the Foreign Secretaries' level was held before the end of March. They then met in June for the second time to identify eight subjects for the eight working groups. While in May the then PM IK Gujral & Nawaz Sharif met in Male. They had a very good equation in the meet and Nawaz Sharif told Mr. Gujral, "Look, we are not prejudging a solution. But at least let us start discussing." So, the June meeting was very important because they agreed on (listing) the eight subjects (for discussion). On June 23, 1997 for the first time those eight subjects were identified. It was agreed - quotes from the Joint Statement issued that day in Islamabad - "to set up a mechanism, including working groups, at appropriate levels, to address all these issues in an integrated manner. The issues at (A) and (B) above will be dealt with at the level of Foreign Secretaries who will also co-ordinate and monitor the progress of work of all the working groups." (A) mentioned peace and security, including confidence-building measures. (B) mentioned Jammu and Kashmir. The rest covered Siachen, Wullar Barrage project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, and so on.

In May 1998 the nuclear tests were conducted. The Security Council, the G-8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, everybody started saying that there must be serious negotiations on Kashmir. They realised that without that the nuclear issue would not be resolved. There was much greater international pressure. The next stage was the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) summit in August 1998 in Durban. Mr. Sartaz Aziz led the Pakistan delegation and paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The two Foreign Secretaries agreed to revive the June 23, 1997 formula. An understanding was reached in Durban but it was not announced that preparatory work would be undertaken for the two Prime Ministers' meeting in New York in September 1998 on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly session. It was at that meeting that the bus service was agreed upon besides a couple of other things.

"The first round of Foreign Ministers' talks on Jammu and Kashmir and security was held here in Islamabad in October 1998. The other six were discussed in New Delhi in November. We were ready, short of normalization, to take certain confidence-building measures which would improve the atmosphere for negotiations. But if there was progress on Kashmir, then other things would also improve faster.

That is the context in which Sharif invited Mr. Vajpayee to come on the first bus. Even in New York they had said, "Well, the Foreign Secretaries are meeting, but ultimately we have to deal with the issues at our level. You can't expect civil servants to resolve the issues." The understanding was that ultimately "we have to come to grips."

Lahore Summit

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 20th February, 1999, crossed the Punjab custom post in gold coloured bus. That bus journey formally launched a regular service between Lahore and Delhi. The Indian Premier was warmly welcomed by Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif. Pakistani and Indian as well as the international media declared it as "Historic" visit. Mr. Vajpayee was the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Pakistan since Rajeev Gandhi's visit in 1989. While the first ever Prime Minister of India to visit Lahore since Nehru's visit in 1951, while expressing his feelings on the arrival at Lahore, Mr Vajpayee said: "I have brought the good will and hope of my fellow Indians who seek abiding peace and harmony with Pakistan. I am conscious this is abiding moments in South Asian history and I hope we will be able to rise to the challenges."

Vajpayee's announcement to visit was widely praised and was compared to Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1971 and Gorbachove visit of Berlin Wall in 1989. Nawaz Sharif was hinting some resistance from few politicians at home and "more likely military offices in Rawalpindi. On February 21st, the Indian Prime Minister addressed a citizens' reception at the governor house Lahore. He said, "We have suffered enmity for so long now is the time for friendship. I know how to win this friendship; difficult decisions would have to be made, a solution of the Kashmir problem would have to be found, but we are ready." The statement was a major shift in the traditional Indian stance on Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif in his speech on the occasion also was of the opinion that both the countries would have to move beyond their traditional positions on Kashmir.

The Lahore declaration signed by the two Prime Ministers on February 21 1999 shared, 'the vision of peace and stability' of the two Prime Ministers. They recorded their commitments to:

- identify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir;

- follow their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda;
- take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

Along with Lahore declaration, the two foreign secretaries signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on nuclear and security issues.

The Lahore Declaration Joint Statement & Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Lahore Declaration

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co- existence

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

- shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
- shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
- shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
- shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
- reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.
- reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.
- shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee - Prime Minister of the Republic of India
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif - Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Joint statement

The following is the text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee's visit to Lahore:

1. In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.
2. The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was

hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e- Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.

3. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:

- o The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.

- o The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.

- o The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.

- o The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.

- o The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.

4. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.

5. Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

6. The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.

7. Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.

8. Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit. Lahore.

Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two side shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.
4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.

5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.

6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.

7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.

8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora. Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid-1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)

Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India

(Shamshad Ahmad)

Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Public & media opinion

The Lahore treaty was very popular in Pakistan's civil society sphere. The general population polls were widely welcomed this move by the Nawaz Sharif Government to normalize relations with India. The news channels, television outlets, and print media widely hailed this move by the Government of Nawaz Sharif to normalize relations with India. Except JI, the far-right party was critical of this treaty; all major political forces in Pakistan, including PPP, hailed and congratulated Nawaz Sharif for successfully reaching the Lahore treaty. However, it was speculated in the Pakistan's news media that many in Pakistan military did not approve of the treaty and consequently worked to subvert it and escalate tensions between the two nations. The reception for Vajpayee, described as the leader of an "enemy-combatant nation," was boycotted by the chiefs of Pakistan military, and those included the Chairman

joint chiefs and army chief General Pervez Musharaff, air chief ACM PQ Mehdi and naval chief Admiral Fasih Bokhari.

The Lahore Declaration was hailed warmly in India and in the global media and by governments of other nations, forging optimism after the global tensions over the 1998 nuclear tests.

The initiative bolstered the popularity of the Vajpayee government in India, cementing his standing as a statesman.

Current Situation in Hand

Tashi Namgyal, Morup Tsering, and Ali Raza Stanba, three shepherds from the tiny village of Garkhun, had made their way up the Banju heights with their flocks of sheep. Shepherds in the Kargil mountains routinely pool their livestock together, assigning groups of two or three villagers by turn to graze the animals on the high meadows. Namgyal and his friends are a little coy about just what led them up towards the Jubbar heights quite so early in summer, but the most plausible explanation is that they hoped to use the time to engage in the region's favourite sport, poaching mountain goats. Tsering carried with him a pair of powerful field binoculars, purchased years earlier in Leh, a tool of particular use for hunting. By the morning of May 3, Namgyal had moved some 5 kilometers up the Jubbar Langpa [nullah or mountain stream]. As he scanned the mountain with Tsering's binoculars, he saw groups of men in Pathan suits, digging earth and putting up makeshift bunkers. Although it was possible neither to establish their numbers nor strength, Namgyal promptly informed officers of the 3 Punjab Regiment, stationed locally. Initial reactions to Namgyal's story appear, by local accounts, to have been more than slightly blasé. According to 15 Corps Commander Lieutenant General Kishan Pal, two patrols subsequently despatched on May 4 and May 5 to Yaldor and Kha Baroro detected seven intruders on the Kukerthang ridge and two at Kha Baroro. Two further patrols were sent up in the night on May 7. The one sent to Kukerthang lost one man in an ambush, while the second patrol lost two soldiers and suffered several injured in a second ambush in the morning on May 10. Clearly, the patrols had not gone out expecting serious resistance

The 15 Corps Commander Lieutenant General Kishan Pal has described the areas where the skirmishes have happened as "unheld areas". The Army further states that carrying out the intrusions can be based on exploitation of the large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sector both on Indian and Pak side of the Line of Control (LoC). The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from the main roads towards the LoC. During winters the area gets very heavy snowfall making movement almost impossible and because of the extreme winter weather conditions in Kashmir, it was a common practice of the Indians and Pakistan Army to vacate high altitude forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. The army has further stated that the people behind these intrusions are still unknown it is

thought that these intrusions could have happened only around March due to the weather conditions involved. At the estimated time of the intrusions, the LOC between Zoji La and Khardung La was thinly monitored by one Indian brigade (about 3000 troops). Clearly, this was a totally inadequate force to monitor such an extensive and rugged terrain, but the decision was based on past experience of a relatively quiet front in that region, and logistical constraints of maintaining men in the harsh terrain of the area. Reports from local commanders suggest that initially local army bases took these as minor infiltrations by terrorists who routinely cross over into Kashmir to perpetrate their heinous acts. However subsequent skirmishes in different regions confirm diversity of tactics employed and this, in tandem with communications intelligence, leads to the conclusion that the ingress was conducted by regular troops with possible non-regular assistance. Heavy shelling by Pakistani Army which led to the damage of the ammunition dump in Kargil also suggest that the intruders are either regulars of the Pakistani Army along with some Mujahedeen or Mujahedeens trained by Pakistan Army for such an operation.

Freeze Date: May 11th 1999 0800 Hours

Meeting Time: May 11th 0900 Hours chaired by the Prime Minister

Major Discussion Points

1. Discussion of the situation in hand
2. Areas currently occupied by the intruders
3. Determining the nature & extent of intrusion as early as possible
4. Measures to be taken immediately by the defence forces
5. Intelligence Failure if any
6. Questioning the inclusion of Pakistan without any substantive proof specially when Lahore summit was a success
7. The Pending elections in the country
8. Ways to ensure that Lahore summit is not taken as a failure of the current government